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Abstract—The paper presents an analysis of the main 
mechanisms of decryption of SSL/TLS traffic. Methods and 
technologies for detecting malicious activity in encrypted 
traffic that are used by leading companies are also 
considered. Also, the approach for intercepting and 
decrypting traffic transmitted over SSL/TLS is developed, 
tested and proposed. The developed approach has been 
automated and can be used for remote listening of the 
network, which will allow to decrypt transmitted data in a 
mode close to real time. 
Keywords—SSL/TLS protocol, vulnerability, attacks, 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Currently there is a trend of increasing the proportion 
of encrypted traffic. Now, according to Cisco, 60% of 
Internet traffic is encrypted, and according to Gartner 
forecasts, by 2019, 80% of the traffic will be [1, 2]. It is 
necessary to ensure the privacy of citizens, to keep 
information in secret, to comply with the requirements of 
the law. But attackers also use encryption to bypass the 
mechanisms for detecting their unauthorized activity, 
hiding interaction with the command servers of malicious 
programs and for other tasks. [1-3]. Skilled criminals can 
steal data inside encrypted traffic, successfully exploit 
vulnerabilities, manage command and control 
communications avoiding detection. With such an 
increase in attacks in encrypted traffic, it is necessary to 
create an approach (method) that can decrypt and verify 
encrypted traffic. This will help to neutralize the danger of 
hidden threats. 
Security products can not see what happens in 
encrypted traffic (according to the Ponemon Institute, 
64% of companies can not detect malicious code in 
encrypted traffic). To penetrate into encrypted 
connections, organizations often use the Man-in-the-
Middle attack for legal purposes, but this is not legal 
(violation of the privacy of correspondence or other 
legislation requirements to ensure the confidentiality of 
information). [4] 
Usually, a gateway or cluster of gateways is installed 
on the perimeter of a corporate or departmental network. 
They perform interception and decryption of data within 
the company's network to protect against attacks using 
SSL/TLS (SSL - Secure Sockets Layer, TLS - Transport 
Layer Security) for the transmission of malicious content, 
and for analyzing transmitted data by Intrusion Detection 
System (IDS) (according to the Ponemon Institute, only 
36% of companies analyze traffic) [4, 5]. 
IDS can analyze and warn about what it can see, but if 
traffic is transmitted in encrypted form, the IDS can 
perform only limited verification based on a packet 
headers. The difficulty of considering the payload of a 
packet makes encrypted traffic one of the hardest 
problems for IDS. 
Developers of leading companies and scientists are 
actively working on developing methods for detecting 
malicious activity in encrypted traffic. Cisco has 
developed a technology called ETA (Encrypted Traffic 
Analytics), which allows, based on network telemetry 
received from network equipment and machine learning 
algorithms, to classify encrypted traffic, incidentally 
separating the net traffic from malicious traffic. 
The goal of this work is development the approach to 
decrypt SSL/TLS traffic for detection hidden threats. 
II. BASIC MECHANISMS FOR CHECKING SSL/TLS
TRAFFIC AND DEVELOPING OF LEADING COMPANIES 
There are two basic mechanisms to inspect SSL/TLS 
traffic, depending on which key information and 
certificate is available, and how the inspection device is 
deployed on the network [6]. 
1. Certificate Re-Signing is the method used to
inspect SSL/TLS on external servers for which 
organization does not have access to server certificates 
and private keys. 
Certificate Re-sign based Inspection is relies on a 
validator that has a trusted CA certificate that can be used 
to sign SSL server certificates that have been intercepted 
and changed. This verification method is used for 
outbound communication of enterprise and intended for 
an external SSL server. The CA certificate used by the 
SSL Visibility Appliance can be self-signed, generated on 
box, and then signed by the corporate CA that processes 
the Certificate Signing Request from the SSL/TLS device 
or is generated by the corporate CA and loaded onto the 
appliance. 
Self-Signed Server Certificates – the SSL Visibility 
Appliance can use re-sign certificate to process self-
signed server certificates or can simply replace keys in a 
self-signed server certificate, in which case the CA in a 
SSL/TLS device is not used, and the server certificate 
remains self-signed. 
2. Known Server Key is relies on an SSL Visibility
Appliance that has a copy of private keys and server 
certificates, and is used for incoming messages that are 
part of an organization that is destined for an internal SSL 
server. Certificates and keys can be easily and safely 
imported into the SSL Visibility Appliance application via 
the management interface or by using the third-party 
Enterprise Key and Certificate Management (EKCM) 
solution such as the Venafi's Trust Protection Platform to 
provide keys and certificates in the SSL Visibility 
Appliance. 
Cisco Encrypted Traffic Analytics retrieves four basic 
data elements: a byte allocation, a TLS-specific function, 
a sequence of packet lengths and times and a source data 
packet. The unique architecture of Cisco's integrated 
circuit architecture (ASIC) provides the ability to retrieve 
these data items without slowing down data network. [2] 
Cisco Stealthwatch Enterprise uses proxy servers, 
endpoint telemetry, NetFlow, traffic segmentation, policy 
and access mechanisms and much more to establish basic 
normal behavior of hosts and users in an enterprise. 
Stealthwatch can correlate traffic with a global threats to 
automatically identify suspicious traffic, infected hosts, 
command and control communications. 
Stealthwatch supports a global risk map: a very wide 
behavioral profile about servers on the Internet, 
identifying the servers associated with attacks that can be 
used as part of an attack in a future. This is not a blacklist, 
but a whole picture in terms of security. Stealthwatch 
analyzes new encrypted traffic data elements in advanced 
NetFlow, using machine learning and statistical modeling. 
The global risk map and the Encrypted Traffic Analytics 
data elements are strengthened using pre-defined security 
analytics. Instead of decrypting traffic, Stealthwatch uses 
machine learning algorithms to identify malicious patterns 
in encrypted traffic in order to identify threats and 
improve response to an incident. 
III. BASIC MECHANISMS OF DECRYPTION 
INFORMATION 
The SANS Institute described four approaches to 
decrypting SSL/TLS connections: 1) performing a check 
on the server itself; 2) the proxy server of the terminals; 3) 
decryption by the IDS itself; 4) autonomous tool for 
decrypting the connection [8-9]. 
1. Perform the inspection on the server itself. The
easiest way to verify encrypted traffic is to use host-based 
IDS (HIDS) on the server, where a traffic belonging to 
this server is decrypted. HIDS can monitor server actions 
and look for changes in databases, unusual behaviors, 
system files or any critical data. Installing HIDS can add 
an additional load, which can negatively affect 
performance, especially for a load server. 
2. SSL/TLS termination proxy (reverse-proxy). A
reverse proxy is a server that acts as an intermediary 
between backend servers and clients. It accepts customer 
requests and retrieves resources effectively hiding 
backend servers from customers. The reverse-proxy 
server can be configured to encrypt SSL/TLS, acting as an 
SSL/TLS termination proxy, which removes the load from 
decrypting SSL/TLS connections, sending unencrypted 
traffic to associated servers. However, using the SSL/TLS 
proxy server allows to use IDS inside an internal network 
of the servers. 
3. The IDS performs the decryption. IDS provides
the ability to perform decryption process with a private 
key. This can be a pre-processor or plug-in that supports 
decryption and normalization of traffic before moving to a 
discovery mechanism. Currently, there is no Snort 
preprocessor for decryption process, although it is 
theoretically possible to develop such a pre-processor or 
plug-in (Snort FAQ, n.d.). However, a decryption function 
is available in some IDS devices, such as Juniper IDP. 
4. Standalone tool performs the decryption. The
Viewssld tool was used to decrypt an SSL/TLS 
connection using RSA key exchange. Viewssld is a free 
open source tool that can decrypt SSL/TLS traffic for 
IDS. It works by listening to an interface of specific IP 
address, decrypting encrypted traffic using the private 
server key and providing the decrypted traffic to IDS 
listening port. It does not support Diffie Hellman key 
exchange; it only supports RSA key exchange. 
Symantec uses the Encrypted Traffic Management 
solution to eliminate blind of encrypted traffic [4]. The 
key component of this SSL Visibility Appliance solutions 
set is a high-performance SSL verification, decryption and 
management tool, scaling to 9 Gbps of SSL decryption 
and capable of simultaneously transmitting the decrypted 
information by several security tools. 
The SSL/TLS verification and decryption capabilities 
provided by SSL Visibility Appliance allow existing 
security tools (IDS/IPS - Intrusion Prevention Systems, 
Malware Analysis, Next Gen Firewalls (NGFW), 
forensics, security analytics platforms) to access open text 
in SSL/TLS traffic, thereby allowing a security device to 
efficiently perform its function, even with SSL/TLS 
encrypted traffic. 
The Gigamon offers the Security Delivery Platform 
GigaSECURE, in which security operations are allowed 
to use an unique "decryption zone" architectural approach 
to solve SSL/TLS decryption problem [7]. In a 
"decryption zone", the SSL/TLS traffic is decrypted once 
and fed to several security and operational tools for 
further analysis and verification, thereby eliminating 
unnecessary and repetitive cycles of decryption and re-
encryption in an infrastructure. With this SSL/TLS 
decryption solution, Gigamon provides ubiquitous 
network visibility to identify malicious threats and 
provide decrypted traffic to an appropriate security tools 
for immediate analysis and management. 
The Ponemon Institute asked respondents to assess the 
likelihood of specific attacks and the ability to resolve 
these attacks, which are shown in Table 1 [4]. 
TABLE I. THE LIKELIHOOD OF THE ATTACK AND THE ABILITY 
TO REMEDIATE THE ATTACKS 
The likelihood 
of 
attack 
to 
resolve 
attack 
S1. The attacker makes phishing threats more 
legitimate, and even informed recipients believe 
that using SSL makes it secure. However, by 
clicking on the link, it is transferred to an SSL 
server that is downloaded by malware that 
infects the client, because the malware traffic is 
encrypted and is not recognized by IPS. 
79% 17% 
S2. The attacker sends an encrypted stream of 
sensitive, secure and other critical data coming 
through the firewall over standart ports, for 
example 443 or 80, which the firewall is 
configured to accept, as they are approved ports. 
78% 30% 
S3. A number of malware families use 
encryption to hide network information, 
including sensitive data and passwords that they 
send to SSL servers. Encryption blinded the 
monitoring systems for these internal network 
activities. 
74% 16% 
S4. An attacker would confuse malicious 
communications when a worm, virus or botnet 
"home phones" sends stolen data to the host 
computer or downloads more malicious code or 
instructions.  
66% 26% 
S5. Using cross-site scripting, attackers steal 
cookies that can be used for a number of things, 
including session or account hijacking, cookie 
poisoning, changing user settings, and/or false 
advertising. All of this can be done by hiding 
within SSL-encrypted traffic. 
62% 19% 
From Table 1 it can be seen that the resolution of the 
attack is rather small, compared with the probability of its 
occurrence.  
The traffic decryption systems will continue to be 
more and more in demand, given the increased use of 
SSL/TLS encryption protocol. There are many situations 
when IT administrators should use packet validation, such 
as Wireshark. However, when application data is 
encrypted, troubleshooting application data becomes more 
complex.  
IV. PROPOSED APPROACH OF TLS TRAFFIC
DECRYPTION 
The approach described in this article is a approach for 
decrypting TLS 1.2 (1.3) traffic , which assumes that 
insider has access to a computer or network, or that an 
insider could put a bookmark on the victim's computer 
that can collect session data. Such conditions are needed 
to generate a session keys file, which will be used along 
with the corresponding intercepted traffic [10]. It is 
possible to intercept the victim's traffic being in any 
network part on a gap between server and a target of an 
attack. 
Below is a description of the proposed approach 
implementation for decrypting TLS traffic. The 
implementation used the Wireshark traffic analyzer, 
which helps to analyze network performance, to diagnose 
problems, and has many other useful features. 
To perform the experiment, a local network consisting 
of three subnets, a web server, an access server was taken. 
To connect computers from subnets to a web server a 
HTTPS by using TLS connection was used. In one of the 
subnets an additional access point was connected and a 
bookmark was made on one of the computers by sending 
it by e-mail. Then, using the Wireshark, the data in the 
network was read by additional point. 
Earlier, by using traffic analyzers to decrypt TLS-
traffic, several problems were encountered. One of these 
problems was the inability to easily analyze encrypted 
traffic like TLS. Also, to decrypt earlier versions of the 
TLS protocol 1.1, it was possible to point to Wireshark 
the private keys, if they were evaluable, and decrypt the 
traffic online, but this worked if only the RSA algorithm 
was used. The second problem is that the private key 
began to be received using the Diffie-Hellman protocol, 
which has high cryptographic strength, besides the private 
key can not be directly downloaded from the client, server 
or HSM (Hardware Security Module) where it is located. 
Because of such problems, it had to resort to actions 
associated with decrypting traffic through a man-in-the-
middle attack (for example, through the sslstrip utility), 
which is of doubtful expediency. 
Now to help get the keys comes logging session keys, 
which are used to encrypt and decrypt traffic. Getting 
such logs is not time consuming. Its can be obtained from 
browsers, for example, since recent versions Firefox and 
Chrome have learned to output data sufficient for 
derivation (reception) of session keys by which encrypts 
transmitted/received traffic, since symmetric encryption is 
used inside TLS. Strictly speaking, this is done not by 
browsers themselves, but by the NSS library in their 
composition; it specifies the format of the recorded files, 
as it described in [11]. In the case of traffic from java 
applications, you can create the required log files by 
examining the JVM (Java Virtual Machines) debug 
entries, namely by using the javax.net.debug option. After 
analyzing the debug entries received from this option, we 
can compile an NSS file with the appropriate format [11]. 
This format can be read and used by Wireshark to decrypt 
TLS records encrypted with the corresponding keys. To 
decrypt of TLS traffic we must have a file with logged 
session key records in NSS-format and a traffic analyzer, 
in this case Wireshark version 1.6.0 or higher. 
Wireshark is very sensitive to the NSS file format, so 
it's better to carefully check whether the number of bytes 
in each line element converges, and if there are not any 
extra spaces anywhere, this can save time. 
As for the traffic analyzer, we need to capture traffic 
after the keys are written to the log file, otherwise we will 
not be able to have the session keys that correspond to the 
captured TLS records. Also it is necessary to remember 
that the keys are "ephemeral". This means that they are 
suitable for only one TLS session, that is, the log from one 
session is not suitable for decrypting the traffic of another 
session. It is also necessary to use skills in working with 
Wireshark: tracking traffic exchange with a specific host 
and filtering by the necessary protocol to initially discard 
unnecessary packets passing through the listening 
interface. After it was possible to generate a file with 
session keys, we need to bind the file to Wireshark. 
Now a package contents appeared tab "Decrypted SSL 
Data". Now, if we go to this tab we can see the text of the 
request. In addition, we can now select any package with 
the SSL/TLS protocol and select the function "Follow 
SSL Stream" in its context menu. The result is the 
contents of the packages in the form shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1.  View of the packages contents in Wireshark 
As seen, in spite of the fact that communication passes 
through SSL/TLS we see the transmitted traffic and can 
export it for further analysis. The peculiarity of the 
described approach is that it is not necessary to intercept 
traffic on a computer that generates TLS traffic, it can be 
intercepted simply by being in a network and listening to 
it. A file with session keys can be obtained by putting a 
bookmark on the victim's computer or simply copying it, 
having access to the computer. 
CONCLUSION 
SSL/TLS has become a universal standard for 
authenticating and encrypting messages between clients 
and servers. It is widely distributed in enterprises and is 
growing rapidly due to the rapid increase in mobile, cloud 
and web applications. However, SSL creates a security 
risk by introducing a "blind spot", which increases the risk 
of malware and unauthorized activity entering the 
organization. SSL / TLS verification is an important and 
desirable function for security analysts, but it has its costs. 
To decrypt traffic, it is desirable to choose a way of 
decrypting traffic based on the needs and design of the 
network: on the server itself, the SSL/TLS termination 
proxy server or using the standalone tool or features added 
to the IDS. If the HIDS is installed on the server itself, it 
can add additional load, which can negatively affect 
performance, especially for a load server. 
In this work, a approach for decrypting SSL/TLS 
traffic was developed, which can be used even in remote 
network listening. This apprioach was automated and 
allows you to decrypt data almost online. 
In [12], an analysis of the TLS usage by malicious and 
corporate applications in the course of which millions of 
encrypted TLS streams were taken and a targeted study of 
18 types of malicious programs consisting of thousands of 
unique samples of malicious programs and ten thousand 
malicious TLS streams. It is concluded that the use of 
TLS by malicious programs differs from benign use in 
enterprise settings and that these differences are 
effectively used in rules and classifiers of machine 
learning. In our future work, we plan to analyze encrypted 
SSL/TLS traffic using data science methods to detect 
unauthorized activity. 
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